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Abstract
It is now a commonplace that the unfunded public pension systems of many OECD
countries will run into severe financing problems in the coming decades due to a
dramatically increasing pensioner/worker ratio. While this diagnosis is completely
undisputed, there is still a vigorous debate on the appropriate therapy. In this debate,
a number of proposals have been brought forward in particular in the last five years,
which mainly consist in a (partial) transition to a funded pension system. Because
such a transition is not a Pareto improvement, it is necessary to ask what can be the
policy target that justifies such a redistributive move? The present paper tries to
examine this question by identifying seven fallacies that are commonly made by
advocates of such a transition.
Zusammenfassung
Es ist heute unbestritten, dass die umlagefinanzierten staatlichen Rentensysteme  in
den meisten OECD.Ländern in den kommenden Jahrzehnten wegen der dramatisch
steigenden Alterslastquote schwerwiegende finanzielle Probleme bekommen
werden. Dennoch gibt es eine intensive Debatte über die angemessene Therapie.
Gerade in den letzten Jahren haben Vorschläge zugenommen, die auf einen
(teilweisen)  Übergang zur Kapitaldeckung hinauslaufen. Da ein solcher Übergang
bekanntlich keine Pareto-Verbesserung bewirkt, muss man fragen, durch welche
Zielsetzungen er gerechtfertigt werden könnte. Die vorliegende Arbeit geht dieser
Frage nach und identifiziert sieben Trugschlüsse, die von Anhängern eines solchen
Übergangs häufig begangen werden.2
1. Introduction
It is now a commonplace that the unfunded public pension systems of many
OECD countries will run into severe financing problems in the coming decades due
to declining fertility and rising longevity and thus a dramatically increasing
pensioner/worker ratio. Most experts agree that systems as the U.S. Social Security
will become “unsustainable”, which means simply that either the average benefit level
(as a percentage of current wages) has to be cut or tax rates must be raised (or a
combination of the two) in order to preserve the budget balance.
While this diagnosis is completely undisputed, there is still a vigorous debate
on the appropriate therapy. In this debate, a number of proposals have been brought
forward in particular in the last five years,
1 which - although they differ somewhat in
the details, e.g. with respect to the role of the private sector - are similar in their
general direction: their main ingredient is an at least partial transition to funding by
gradually building up a reserve fund. In this process, the total burden on taxpayers,
i.e. the sum of the contributions to the “old” and the “new” system, is somewhat
increased for a transition period, whereas all future generations will benefit from
forever lower tax rates.
However, it has been known for several years that such a transition from
unfunded to funded pensions can never raise the utility of all (present and future)
generations.
2 The economic intuition of this result is very simple: The present value
of the sum of net contributions of the present and all future generations to the
unfunded system is invariant to the financing mode: it equals the accumulated value
of the net gains of all past generations from establishing the system (Sinn 2000;
p.395).
                                                          
1 The proposals are normally founded on simulation exercises in which one possible time
path of contributions is calculated for a particular set of assumptions on the underlying
economy (e.g. technology and preferences), including so-called “realistic parameter values”.
See e.g. Feldstein/Samwick (1997), Kotlikoff et al. (1998) and Modigliani et al (2000) for the
U.S., Börsch-Supan (1998a) for Germany.
2 Unfortunately, the proofs of this proposition under different sets of assumptions were
published in two papers (Breyer 1989 and Fenge 1995) that were written in English, but
appeared in journals that are not so easily accessible to North American readers, viz. the
Journal of Theoretical and Institutional Economics and Finanzarchiv. Only a related paper
(Brunner 1996) appeared in the Journal of Public Economics. Nevertheless, the non-Pareto-
improving nature of such a transition is recognized even by Feldstein (1996), p.12.3
Given this Pareto optimality result, it is necessary to ask what can be the
policy target that justifies such a (intergenerationally redistributive) move? The
present paper tries to examine this question by identifying seven fallacies that are
commonly made by advocates of such a transition.
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2. Seven Fallacies in Advocating a Transition to Funded Pensions
Fallacy 1: The higher the return to capital relative to the growth rate, the smaller is
the transitional burden compared to the long-term gain for future generations.
As every student learns in the Economics 101 course, costs and benefits that accrue
at different points in time can only be compared if they are discounted to the same
period (e.g. the present). If we use the market interest rate for the discounting, and if
this rate equals the return to capital,
4 we see that the net present value of costs and
benefits of a transition is always zero, regardless of the interest rate: discounting
back to the present by a higher interest rate exactly offsets the beneficial effect of a
higher interest rate on the future time path of contributions.
Fallacy 2: The U.S. is presently in a favorable situation since current surpluses in the
government budget can be used to smooth the transition by dampening the
necessary increase in contributions in the early periods (Modigliani et al. 2000,
p.21).
We can again refer to Economics 101 to show that it is not the monetary outlay that
measures the burden placed on the transition generation but the opportunity costs.
Using the budget surplus to accumulate funds in the Social Security Trust Fund
precludes alternative uses such as paying off government debt, increasing
government expenditures (e.g. on infrastructure) or cutting taxes. No matter which of
these alternative uses is foregone by putting the money in the Trust Fund, somebody
has to bear an additional burden here, as well.
                                                          
3 Some of the points discussed in this paper were already made by Sinn (2000).
4 The mistake of using a discount rate smaller than the return to capital seems to underlie the
calculations of net gain made by Feldstein (1996, p.12).4
Fallacy 3: By abolishing the unfunded social security system, we can get rid of the
labor supply distortion created by the payroll tax through which the system is
financed (see, e.g. Feldstein 1996, pp 2ff.).
That this claim is false, follows immediately from the refutation of Fallacy 1: The tax
wedge arises from the difference between the present values of contributions and
benefits and therefore from the net payments into the system. As it was shown that
the present value of all future net payments is already determined, there is no way of
changing the total tax wedge. The only thing that can be influenced (within limits) is
total deadweight loss, and the appropriate instrument to do so is tax smoothing.
Abolishing the PAYGO system within a limited time means concentrating the total tax
wedge on a limited number of cohorts of tax payers, which is certainly the surest way
to maximize rather than minimize total deadweight loss.
Fallacy 4: The true economic gain from a shift to funded pensions is just the gain
from increasing capital accumulation (Feldstein 1996, p.12).
A very nice way of characterizing the error implicit in this statement is due to
Homburg (1996, p.237): “Saying that it would be profitable to have more wealth is
different from saying that it would be profitable to form more wealth.” Assuming a
closed economy, the additional capital accumulation has to come from increased
savings and therefore implies foregoing present consumption. If individuals refrain
from making these changes it is either because their intertemporal rate of substitution
is equal to the marginal return of capital (and therefore their behavior is optimal) or
because their behavior is distorted by taxes on capital returns. But then the blame is
to be put on the taxes and not on the presence of a PAYGO system.
Fallacy 5: If we want to change the distribution of consumption possibilities in favor
of future generations, we need to downsize the unfunded public pension system
(or, for that matter, reduce government debt).
To show that this proposition is false, we can invoke a normative equivalent of
Ricardian equivalence: if any person living today wants to change the distribution in
favor of members of the next generation, she can simply increase her savings and
leave a higher bequest than otherwise.5
It is a separate issue whether the “if”-clause in Fallacy 5 is justified. With respect to
whether and how the consumption possibilities should be redistributed, there are
probably conflicting interests within the present (older) generation: There is
(A) the group of people without any altruism vis-à-vis the young generation, e.g.
people without children or other younger close relatives,
(B) the group of people with altruism, e.g. those with own children.
But even within group B, preferences may differ between members of the following
subgroups:
(B1) couples with one child, for whom private saving is an efficient way of
undoing the intergenerational transfer effected through social security,
(B2) couples with several children, for whom the leverage effect is larger when
the Social Security system is scaled down because for the same loss to
them the gain to each child is bigger than when they privately save.
Presumably, it is only the group B2 whose members will be in favor of reforming
Social Security because this system implicitly redistributes not only from the young to
the old but also from the growing to the shrinking dynasties (see on this Breyer and
Schulenburg 1987, 1990). So there will never be a consensus in society on whether
and, even if so, how to redistribute towards future generations.
But instead of arguing on the basis of a consensus among the population, advocates
of a transition could also cite alternative justifications. One of these would be a clear
implication of a commonly accepted equity norm, the other one the expectation that
maintaining the present system will become politically unsustainable. We shall
examine these justification in turn.
Fallacy 6: Widely accepted welfare criteria imply that future generations should be
made better off by partial funding.
Considering the multitude of different principles of equity, it is unlikely that there is
one that most people agree upon and that makes clear-cut statements on the
necessity of a transition to funded pensions.
For example, if the Rawlsian maximin principle is applied to a sequence of
generations, it is very doubtful that future generations should be made better off as6
long as productivity is growing because in this case those that live later are better off
in the absence of intergenerational transfers. Thus some degree of redistribution
towards the older generations may even be required by the maximin principle.
A much less demanding (and maybe even slightly controversial) target would be to
smooth the sequence of net losses accruing to future generations due to their
participation in the PAYGO system. As Kifmann and Schindler (2001) have shown,
this aim may justify building up a moderate-sized reserve fund in times of rapid
demographic change. While the importance of this result shall not be downplayed,
the policy proposed in that paper is hardly what Feldstein and others have in mind
when they plea for a transition to “funding”.
Fallacy 7: The government must protect present workers from suffering sudden and
unanticipated cuts in future benefits, which are likely to be enacted by future
generations of voters/taxpayers. It can do so by gradually phasing down unfunded
social security over a long time span.
This is a sophisticated argument that certainly deserves further thought, but it is
nevertheless flawed. The error is a common neglect of the politico-economic principle
that in a democracy the government can not be more far-sighted than the
representative citizen. The government can thus not impose a policy of prudence
unless the majority of voters hold the belief that future benefits will be smaller than
promised by the presently valid law. But if this is the case, it is the voters themselves
who can build up supplementary savings. In practice, voters’ expectations will differ
among each other, and in view of the underlying real uncertainty of the future, no one
living today can be absolutely sure whether and by what amount future benefits will
be cut.
Therefore, there is no justification to use coercion to make people build up
supplementary pension claims. Rather, it is the appropriate policy in a free society to
let every person form her own expectations as to what will be the future level of
benefits and find the right strategy to cope with the expected development. As
savings have no discernible public-good characteristic, there is no a-priori
presumption that we are all better off if we let the majority decide on the necessary
level of savings. In this context, it is particularly surprising that many of the7
proponents of a government-mandated increase in retirement savings are otherwise
staunch advocates of the free market.
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3. Concluding Remarks
The present paper rests on the belief that when economists in their role as policy-
advisers make specific proposals, they should always make clear what groups of
society would be affected positively or negatively if the proposals were followed. It
has become somewhat out of fashion to be so open about possible losers – a
practice which is certainly justified if there are no losers, that is, if the proposed
changes are Pareto improvements.
Moreover, proposing policy changes that involve income redistribution from some
groups to others is not even the comparative advantage of economists. It is rather
the typical behavior of lobbyists of the respective groups or party politicians. In this
sense it is very strange that so many otherwise excellent economists devote so much
of their time and effort to advocating a policy reform that will basically bring about
nothing but a change in the intergenerational distribution. But granted that
economists have the right to do so, they should at least be honest to say so.
To prevent a possible misunderstanding: the present paper does not argue that a
particular pension reform should not be introduced. Quite to the contrary, it says that
there are no compelling reasons that it should be introduced. A compelling reason
would be a Pareto improvement because in that case no member or group of society,
once properly informed, would have reasons to reject the change.
                                                          
5 On the welfare effects of compulsory savings see the recent paper by Homburg (2000).8
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